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buildings, fences and feeding floors, the item may have been
depreciated out and has no basis.
It is suggested that any reduction in income tax basis required
can be accomplished by reducing the basis of any assets used in
the trade or business.  This would allow reduction of the basis to
the land rather than triggering more income tax liability for an
already financially troubled taxpayer and would be in keeping
with the relief character of the statute (I.R.C. § 108(e)(5)).
12. The low farm prices are certain to lead to farm and ranch
bankruptcies.  Several suggestions are made to facilitate the
bankruptcy and debt restructuring processes—
a. Chapter 12 bankruptcy is scheduled to sunset on September
30, 1998.  Legislation is pending to make the provision
permanent.
It is strongly suggested that Chapter 12 bankruptcy be made
permanent before October 1, 1998.
b. The Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 was never amended to add
chapter 12 bankruptcy to the chapters (7 and 11) for which a new
tax entity is created on filing.  Accordingly, taxpayers in chapter
12 bankruptcy do not have the same planning opportunities as are
available to chapter 7 and 11 filers.  This is especially important
to farm and ranch taxpayers because of the substantial amount of
gain typically involved in financially troubled farm and ranch
businesses.
It is suggested that I.R.C. § 1398 be amended to add chapter 12
to the chapters for which a new tax entity is created upon
bankruptcy filing.
c.Abandoned property in bankruptcy has posed a serious
obstacle to a "fresh start" which is one of the two major objectives
of bankruptcy in this country.  The problem is that when assets
are abandoned to the debtor (where the property is worth less than
what is owed on it) under 11 U.S.C. § 554, two Courts of Appeal
have held that the debtor rather than the bankruptcy estate bears
the income tax liability.
It is suggested that legislation be enacted which would require
the gain on abandoned property to be taxed to the bankruptcy
estate.  This has impacted adversely farm and ranch firms in
particular because of zero income tax basis on many assets.
13. The family-owned business deduction, enacted as an
exclusion in 1997 and converted to a deduction in 1998
legislation, was badly flawed as originally enacted.  The 1998
amendments addressed serious problems with pre-death and post-
death cash renting but several problems remain which must be
addressed in order for the concept to be fully workable.
a. The provision requires that assets, to be eligible for the
deduction, must have been owned for five of the last eight years
before death.  That is a serious problem for crops, raised livestock
and even machinery.
Language has been provided to the Senate Finance Committee
and Joint Committee on Taxation in 1998 specifying that the
holding period would not apply to inventory or inventory-like
property or to depreciable assets used in the business.  It is urged
that this amendment be enacted.
b. The FOBD statute as originally enacted made no provision
for post-death disposition of assets during the recapture period.
Accordingly, any sale of crops or livestock would lead to
recapture.  When this problem was called to the attention of the
conference committee in late July, 1997, a paragraph was added
to the conference committee report indicating that recapture
should not occur upon sale or exchange of such assets as grain or
machinery in the course of business.  However, it was too late to
add a provision to the statute.  Efforts to amend the statute in
1998 were unsuccessful.
It is suggested that legislation be enacted providing that post-
death dispositions in the course of business not cause recapture.
An even better solution would be to adopt the I.R.C. § 6166
approach which allows up to 50 percent of the assets to be
transferred without accelerating the deferred tax.
c. At present, interest begins to run in the event of recapture on
the date the federal estate tax was due, not on the date of the
recapture event.  This is a punitive provision.
It is suggested that the provision be amended to specify that
interest would begin on the date of the recapture event.  This
would conform the provision to the recapture treatment under
special use valuation (I.R.C. § 2032A).
14. Since 1986, when the last amendment was made to I.R.C. §
464 on prepaid farm expenses, farmers and ranchers have been
allowed to deduct on a prepurchased basis a maximum of 50
percent of total deductible farming expenses not counting the
prepaid expenses.  Two exceptions were provided for "qualified
farm-related taxpayers," one of which is for "extra ordinary
circumstances."
It is suggested that Congress specify that the 1996 farm bill be
deemed such an "extra ordinary circumstance" because of the
increased expenditures under the 1996 legislation since land is no
longer idled.
15. A problem of some significance under special use valuation
(and under the family-owned business deduction) is that there is
no authority on post-death mortgaging of assets as to whether
post-death mortgaging would constitute a recapture event.
It is suggested that an amendment be enacted for both I.R.C. §
2032A and I.R.C. § 2057 providing that post-death borrowing
using assets subject to the respective elections is not a recapture
event so long as the resulting funds are used in the business or for
the purchase of assets used in the business.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT. The taxpayer filed for
Chapter 7 on October 20, 1997. The taxpayer listed on Schedule
B an Earned Income Tax Credit (EIC) for the 1997 tax year. The
taxpayer argued that the EIC was not property of the estate since
it was neither a legal nor an equitable interest of the taxpayer as of
the commencement of the case. The court held that an EIC was
property of the bankruptcy estate, even when the case is filed
before the end of the tax year for which the EIC was claimed.  In
re Johnston, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,625 (Bankr. 6th
Cir. 1998).
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FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAX
FAMILY-OWNED BUSINESS DEDUCTION-ALM §
5.04[7].*  A bill has been introduced in the U.S. House of
Representatives which would remove the family-owned business
deduction limitation for sole proprietorships and entities owned
entirely by the decedent and members of the decedent’s family. A
business or entity eligible for the unlimited deduction must have
an annual reinvestment amount not less than the annual adjusted
net earnings. The reinvestment amount equals (1) the increase
during the taxable year in net asset investment in the same trade
or business, plus (2) the increase during the taxable year in
working capital of the same trade or business. “The increase
during the taxable year in net asset investment is an amount equal
to the excess (if any) of (I) the net asset investment as of the close
of the taxable year, over (II) the net asset investment as of the
close of the preceding taxable year. The term 'net asset
investment' means the excess (if any) of (I) the aggregate adjusted
bases of qualified assets held by the taxpayer for use in the active
conduct of a trade or business, over (II) the aggregate outstanding
amount of indebtedness of the taxpayer which was incurred to
acquire or improve qualified assets so held.” The term “adjusted
net earnings” means taxable income "(i) increased by the sum of
(I) the amount of interest received or accrued by the taxpayer
during the taxable year which is exempt from tax, and (II) the
amount allowed for depreciation or amortization, and (ii)
decreased by the tax imposed by chapter 1 for the taxable year."
H.R. 4521.
GIFT. The taxpayer released a contingent reversionary interest
in a GRIT in 1989 based upon the taxpayer’s reasonable belief,
following the advice of counsel, that I.R.C. § 2036(c) would exact
greater tax consequences against the taxpayer’s estate if the
taxpayer did not make the release. Congress retroactively
repealed, nunc pro tunc, Section 2036(c), rendering that proviso
and its implementing IRS Notice null and void, as if it had never
existed. The court held that the taxpayer could claim a refund of
gift taxes paid on the original release of the contingent
reversionary interest. Neal v. United States, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,318 (W.D. Penn. 1998).
GROSS ESTATE. The decedent had owned stock with the
decedent’s predeceased spouse as tenants by the entirety. The
stock was received when the corporation, owned in part by the
spouse, transferred the stock to the decedent’s spouse and the
decedent who took ownership with the decedent as tenants by the
entirety. In October 1986, the decedent and spouse transferred
$140,000 of stock to their two children for life with remainders to
their grandchildren. The decedent and spouse elected to treat the
gift as a split gift with each claiming a gift of $70,000 less two
$10,000 exclusions. The spouse died within three years after the
gift and the estate included the taxable gift of $50,000 in the gross
estate. Under I.R.C. § 2001(e), if a joint gift was entirely
includible in the spouse’s estate under I.R.C. § 2035, then none of
the gift was included in the decedent’s estate. The court held that
the gift was not included in the spouse’s estate under I.R.C. §
2035 but was included in the spouse’s estate under I.R.C. §
2001(b) as a taxable gift. The estate argued that, because the
decedent received the stock for no consideration, the full amount
of the gifted stock should have been included in the spouse’s
gross estate under I.R.C. § 2040. The court held that I.R.C. § 2040
did not apply because the gifted stock was not owned by the
spouse and decedent at the time of the spouse’s death. The court
acknowledged that, under I.R.C. § 2035(a), property transferred
within three years of death is treated as owned by the decedent;
however, the court held that I.R.C. § 2035 did not apply because
the stock was included in the spouse’s estate by virtue of I.R.C. §
2001(b). The appellate court affirmed in a case designated as not
for publication.  Estate of Greco v. Comm’r, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 60,319 (4th Cir. 1998), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1996-373.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* At the time Treas.
Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7(d)(3) was promulgated, the position
contained in the regulation was the subject of litigation in a
number of cases and had been rejected by two circuit courts in
Estate of Clayton v. Comm’r, 976 F.2d 1486 (5th Cir. 1992), rev'g
97 T.C. 327 (1991), and Estate of Robertson v. Comm’r, 15 F.3d
779 (8th Cir. 1994), rev'g 98 T.C. 678 (1992). Since that time,
Estate of Spencer v. Comm’r, 43 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 1995), rev'g
T.C. Memo. 1992-579, also rejecting the IRS position, has been
decided. Additionally, in Estate of Clack v. Comm’r, 106 T.C. 131
(1996), the Tax Court reversed the position it had taken
previously in Estate of Clayton, Estate of Robertson, and Estate
of Spencer. The IRS has adopted as final amendments to the
regulations in accordance with the circuit courts' decisions in
Estate of Clayton, Estate of Robertson, and Estate of Spencer, and
the Tax Court's decision in Estate of Clack. The amendment adds
Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7T(d)(3)(ii), which states that an income
interest (or life estate) that is contingent upon the executor's
election under section 2056(b)(7)(B)(v) will not be precluded, on
that basis, from qualification as a “qualifying income interest for
life'' within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7)(B)(ii). The final
amendments included a provision that an interest in property is
eligible for treatment as qualified terminable interest property if
the income interest is contingent upon the executor's election and
if that portion of the property for which no election is made will
pass to or for the benefit of beneficiaries other than the surviving
spouse. In accordance with the addition of Treas. Reg. §
20.2056(b)-7T(d)(3)(ii), Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-7T(h), Example
6(ii) and Treas. Reg. § 20.2044-1T Example 8 were also added.
63 Fed. Reg. 44391 (Aug. 19, 1998).
The decedent had created two trusts. The first trust had two
shares, one for marital deduction property sufficient to reduce the
federal estate tax to zero and one for other property. A second
trust passed entirely to the surviving spouse. The decedent’s will
provided for payment of death taxes from the residue of the estate
before payment from the property in the trusts.  The decedent’s
estate had no residuary property and the death taxes were paid
from insurance proceeds in the second trust. Under California
law, taxes owed by an estate are prorated to each beneficiary
unless the decedent elects not to have the proration provision
apply. The IRS argued that the election out of the proration statute
was made; therefore, the property passing to the marital deduction
trust, and the size of the marital deduction, were reduced by the
trust’s share of estate taxes. The court held that the integrated
estate plan evidenced by the decedent’s formation of the trusts
and the will demonstrated that the decedent intended the estate
taxes to be paid by either the residuary estate or the second trust,
in order to maximize the effect of the marital deduction from
passing of property to the marital trust. McKeon v. United
States, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,317 (9th Cir. 1998).
TRUSTS. The taxpayer was a beneficiary of a testamentary
trust. The trust was funded with stock, and the trustee borrowed
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funds on margin from a brokerage account and loaned the money
to the decedent’s estate and corporations owned by the estate. The
loans were not evidenced by repayment schedules, fixed maturity
dates or notes but the loans were ratified by the estate
representatives and the boards of directors of the corporations.
The estate did not have any distributable net income (DNI) for the
tax years involved but paid the trust interest on the loans. The
taxpayer argued that because the estate had no DNI, the trust did
not have any DNI from the interest payments. The Tax Court held
that the taxpayer had to include distributions from the trust in
gross income because the interest payments were DNI to the trust.
The appellate court reversed, holding that no debt existed between
the trust and estate; therefore, the payments were not taxable
interest to the trust. Because the estate had no DNI, no DNI was
passed on to the trust in the payments. Geftman v. Comm’r, 98-2





CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer owned rural
land and leased a portion of the land to a corporation owned by
the taxpayer. The corporation built a building on the land which
involved an open first floor with no facilities and a second floor
which contained four bedrooms and four full bathrooms. The
taxpayer and family lived in the second floor area. The rent paid
by the corporation exceeded the fair market rental for the property
and was not paid by the corporation. The lease also required the
corporation to pay all taxes associated with the leased property
but the taxpayer personally made these payments. The corporation
maintained a separate site which was used for business
operations. The court held that the corporation’s rent and
construction payments were constructive distributions to the
taxpayer. In a second hearing on the tax character of the
constructive distributions, the taxpayer argued that some of the
distributions were not taxable as return of the taxpayer’s basis in a
loan to the corporation. The court held that I.R.C. § 301 had no
provision for reduction of the basis of corporate debt.  The court
noted that the original holding did not include any finding of a
debt to the corporation. See also Spera v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1998-225. Spera v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-299.
STOCK REDEMPTION. This ruling involved Class B stock
issued by a regional Farm Credit Bank (Bank). The Class B stock
was stock required to be owned by member borrowers. Some
members became concerned that the Bank’s program of rebating
interest on loans through transfer of additional Class B stock to
member borrowers increased the cost of their loans as compared
to other members with fewer or smaller loans. The Bank entered
into an agreement to redeem some of the Class B stock to make
the loan costs more equitable among the members. An auditing
agent argued that the effect of the transaction was the same as if
the Bank redeemed all of its Class B stock and the members
immediately loaned the proceeds back to the Bank which then
paid interest on such proceeds by means of the interest rebate
program. This would have the effect of converting the Class B
stock to debt. The IRS ruled that the stock would not be treated as
debt because it had no indicia of debt, such as a maturity date,
priority to liquidation proceeds, and right to demand repayment.
FSA 1993-0803-1.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The taxpayer
participated in an early retirement program provided by the
taxpayer’s employer. In exchange for various payments and
benefits, the taxpayer signed a release form which released the
employer from all claims that the taxpayer had against the
employer arising from employment or the termination of
employment. The taxpayer did not negotiate the terms of the
program and received no payments or benefits not offered to other
participants. The taxpayer argued that a portion of the payments
were received for personal injuries but did not identify the
personal injuries. The court found that the payments were made
according to the general early retirement program and not
according to any claim of personal injury made by the taxpayer;
therefore, the payments were included in the taxpayer’s gross
income. Aschkenasy v. Comm’r, 98-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,634 (S.D. N.Y. 1998).
The taxpayers were in a class of plaintiffs who alleged that their
employer interfered with the attainment of members' pension
rights in violation of Section 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §1140, by
laying them off before those rights vested in order to reduce its
projected pension liabilities. Partial summary judgment on
liability was granted in favor of the class, and a special master
was appointed to assist in the settlement of damages issues or to
recommend a procedure to expedite their resolution. Although the
special master did not have the authority to determine the ultimate
tax consequences of the settlement award, he described the award
as compensation for mental anguish, dignitary harm, and loss in
earnings capacity. The court noted that two other cases involving
this class action have split on the inclusion of the settlement in
gross income. See Dotson v. United States, 87 F.3d 682 (5th Cir.
1996) and Hemelt v. United States, 122 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 1997).
The court held that the settlement payments were wages subject to
FICA and income tax. Mayberry v. United States, 98-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,632 (8th Cir. 1998).
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS-ALM § 4.02[15].* The
taxpayer sold oil, gas, and mineral leases and the operating rights,
mineral interests, royalty interests, overriding royalty interests,
payments out of production and interests in or under certain unit
agreements. The sale was made under a purchase agreement in
exchange for cash, a production payment and a promissory note.
The production payment was payable solely out of a certain
percentage of the production from the properties, terminated when
a certain percentage of the reserves, as estimated at the time of
sale, had been produced, and had an economic life of shorter
duration than the economic life of the burdened properties. The
production payment and the recourse note are secured by a
mortgage under which the property interests are pledged as
collateral. Under Treas. Reg. § 1.636-1(a)(3), the production
payment was properly characterized as a purchase money
mortgage loan. Under the agreement the taxpayer reserved a
repurchase option with respect to all or any undivided portion of
the leases or any individual lease. The Agreement specifies that
the repurchase price is the calculated fair market value
(determined by an annual engineering report) of the property
being reacquired with certain adjustments. The taxpayer exercised
its right under the agreement to repurchase an undivided 30
percent of the property interests in exchange for a cash payment
and a partial release of the buyer’s indebtedness represented by
the production payment. The IRS ruled that the discharge of
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indebtedness income was governed by I.R.C. § 1038. Ltr. Rul.
9833005, May 12, 1998.
GROSS INCOME. The taxpayer won $10 million in a lottery
and sought tax advice from an attorney. The attorney failed to
advise the taxpayer to pay state taxes in the year of the lottery
payment and the taxpayer paid more federal taxes than if the state
taxes were paid in that year. The taxpayer sought compensation
from the attorney and sought advice as to whether the
compensation would be included in gross income. The IRS cited
Clark v. Comm’r, 40 B.T.A. 333 (1939) and Rev. Rul. 57-47,
1957-1 C.B. 23 which both ruled that reimbursements for excess
tax payments caused by tax return preparation errors were not
included in gross income. However, the IRS ruled in this case that
no filing error occurred and no incorrect tax was paid, based on
the actual circumstances; therefore, any reimbursement would be
included in gross income. Thus, if the taxpayer had paid the state
tax but the deduction for the state tax was not properly taken, a
reimbursement for the excess tax paid would be excluded from
income. Ltr. Rul. 9833007, May 13, 1998.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1]. *  The taxpayers, husband
and wife operated two businesses, a dental practice and an apple
orchard. The taxpayers operated the dental practice and the
orchard as a partnership. The taxpayers combined the income and
expenses of both activities on one partnership return. In most tax
years the dental practice was reported on Schedule C and the
orchard on Schedule F, but in one tax year, both activities were
reported on Schedule F. The taxpayers claimed that the activities
were related in that the taxpayers recommended that their patients
eat apples and gave or sold apples to the clients. The court held
that the dental practice was not sufficiently related to the orchard
activity to allow the activities to be combined as one business for
income tax purposes. The court also held that the orchard activity
was not engaged in for profit, based on the following factors: (1)
the taxpayers did not keep accurate and full production records;
(2) the taxpayers kept only a “canceled check” record of business
transactions; (3) the only changes to the orchard operation were
made to decrease the work load of the taxpayers and not to make
the activity more profitable; (4) the taxpayers had little experience
or expertise in growing apples and did not seek sufficient expert
assistance; (5) the taxpayers did not spend sufficient amount of
time on the activity to fully harvest the apples; (6) the orchard had
never produced a profit; and (7) the taxpayers had substantial
income from the dental practice which was offset by the losses
from the orchard activity. The court denied deductions related to
the orchard activity in excess of the income from the activity.
Zdun v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-296.
The taxpayers, husband and wife maintained Arabian horses for
breeding, raising and racing. The court held that the horse
operation was not operated for profit based on the following
factors: (1) the taxpayers did not keep full and accurate records of
the horse activity, a separate bank account or a plan to make the
operation profitable; (2) the taxpayers had little expertise in the
business of horse raising or racing and did not seek expert help;
(3) the husband was involved full time in the activity but the wife
was fully employed elsewhere; (4) the horses did not appreciate in
value from the taxpayers’ activities; (5) the activity never reported
a profit and had little revenue generated by the racing; (6) the wife
had substantial income from other employment which was offset
by the horse activity losses; and (7) the taxpayer derived
substantial personal pleasure from the activity. Surridge v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1998-304.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
August 1998
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.48 5.41 5.37 5.35
110% AFR 6.04 5.95 5.91 5.88
120% AFR 6.60 6.49 6.44 6.40
Mid-term
AFR 5.57 5.49 5.45 5.43
110% AFR 6.13 6.04 6.00 5.97
120% AFR 6.70 6.59 6.54 6.50
Long-term
AFR 5.72 5.64 5.60 5.57
110% AFR 6.30 6.20 6.15 6.12
120% AFR 6.88 6.77 6.71 6.68
September 1998
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.42 5.35 5.31 5.29
110% AFR 5.98 5.89 5.85 5.82
120% AFR 6.52 6.42 6.37 6.34
Mid-term
AFR 5.54 5.47 5.43 5.41
110% AFR 6.11 6.02 5.98 5.95
120% AFR 6.67 6.56 6.51 6.47
Long-term
AFR 5.74 5.66 5.62 5.59
110% AFR 6.33 6.23 6.18 6.15
120% AFR 6.91 6.79 6.73 6.70
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
SHAREHOLDER’S SHARE. The IRS has issued proposed
regulations governing the determination of an S corporation’s
shareholder’s share of pass-through items. In the case of most
items that must be separately stated by an S corporation, the
provisions by which an S corporation accounts to its shareholders
for tax purposes under I.R.C. § 1366 closely parallel the
provisions for a partnership accounting to its partners under I.R.C.
§ 702. The proposed regulations provide rules outlining this
general pass-through scheme for S corporations to their
shareholders.
The proposed regulations define tax-exempt income as income
that is permanently excludible from the gross income of an S
corporation and its shareholders in all circumstances in which the
relevant I.R.C. section applies. For example, tax-exempt income
includes proceeds of life insurance contracts that are payable by
reason of an individual's death and that are excludible from gross
income under I.R.C. § 101, and interest on state and local bonds
that is excludible from gross income under I.R.C. § 103.
However, income that is excludible from gross income pursuant
to a provision of the I.R.C. that might have the effect of deferring
income to the S corporation or its shareholders is not tax-exempt
income. For example, income from the discharge of indebtedness
that is excludible from gross income under I.R.C. § 108 does not
constitute tax-exempt income because the attribute reduction
provisions of I.R.C. § 108(b) have the effect of deferring the
recognition of such income in some circumstances while
permanently excluding it, in whole or in part, in other
circumstances. See Nelson v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 114 (1998).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-1(a)(2)(vii).
Consistent with the adoption of parallel operational rules
between I.R.C. §§ 702 and 1366, the items of an S corporation are
generally characterized in the same manner that partnership items
are characterized. The partnership rules provide that the character
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of a partnership item reported by a partner is generally determined
at the entity level under a conduit rule. The proposed regulations
provide a similar conduit rule under which the character of a
corporate item that is passed through to and reported by a
shareholder is generally determined at the corporate level.
However, exceptions to the general rule apply for contributions of
either noncapital gain property or capital loss property if an S
corporation is formed or availed of by any shareholder or
shareholders for a principal purpose of selling or exchanging the
property to alter the character of the gain or loss. The character of
the gain or loss will be the same as it would have been if the
property were in the hands of the shareholder or shareholders at
the time of the sale or exchange. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-
1(b).
In general, I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) and the proposed regulations
provide that the amount of losses and deductions taken into
account by a shareholder for any taxable year may not exceed the
sum of the shareholder's adjusted bases in the stock of the S
corporation and in any indebtedness of the S corporation to the
shareholder. Moreover, any loss or deduction for the taxable year
not taken into account by a shareholder by reason of the basis
limitation rule is treated under I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2) and the
proposed regulations as incurred by the corporation with respect
to that shareholder in the corporation's first succeeding taxable
year, and subsequent taxable years. For purposes of the basis
limitation rule in I.R.C. § 1366(d), the basis of stock acquired by
gift is the basis of the stock for determining loss under I.R.C. §
1015. The basis rules under I.R.C. § 1015 operate to minimize the
loss recognized by a donee upon the sale or exchange of the loss
stock acquired by gift. Therefore, the basis limitation rule limits a
donee shareholder's pass-through items of loss or deduction to the
basis used for determining loss upon the sale or exchange of the
stock acquired by gift. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-2(a).
The proposed regulations provide that if a shareholder's
aggregate pro rata share of the items of loss and deduction
exceeds the sum of the shareholder's adjusted bases in stock and
debt, the limitation on losses and deductions must be allocated
among the shareholder's pro rata share of each loss or deduction.
This allocation is determined by taking the proportion that each
loss or deduction bears to the total of all losses and deductions,
including those previously disallowed. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1366-2(a).
Also under the proposed regulations, a shareholder's disallowed
losses and deductions are personal to that shareholder and cannot
be transferred. Moreover, if a shareholder transfers all of the
shareholder's stock in an S corporation, any disallowed loss or
deduction is permanently disallowed. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1366-2(a)(5).
The proposed regulations provide special rules for a shareholder
to carry over disallowed losses and deductions to any post-
termination transition period. Those rules generally follow the
limitation rules provided in the proposed regulations for years in
which the S corporation election is in effect, except that the
amount of losses and deductions that may be taken into account is
limited to the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock (rather than
stock and debt) in the corporation determined at the close of the
post-termination transition period. See I.R.C. § 1366(d)(3)(B).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2).
The proposed regulations provide rules regarding the carryover
of disallowed losses and deductions in the event of certain
corporate reorganizations. If a corporation acquires, in a
transaction to which I.R.C. § 381(a) applies, the assets of another
S corporation for which disallowed losses and deductions would
carry over with respect to a shareholder under I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2),
except for the reorganization, the losses and deductions will be
available to that shareholder. Where the acquiring corporation is
an S corporation, the losses and deductions will be treated as
incurred by the acquiring S corporation with respect to that
shareholder. Where the acquiring corporation is a C corporation,
the proposed regulations provide special rules for a shareholder to
carry over disallowed losses and deductions to any post-
termination transition period under I.R.C. § 1377 if the
shareholder is a shareholder of the C corporation after the
transaction. In the case of an S corporation that transfers a part of
its assets constituting an active trade or business to another
corporation in a transaction to which I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D)
applies, and immediately thereafter the stock and securities of the
controlled corporation are distributed in a distribution or
exchange to which I.R.C. § 355 (or so much of I.R.C. § 356 as
relates to I.R.C. § 355) applies, any disallowed loss or deduction
with respect to a shareholder of the distributing corporation
immediately before the transaction is allocated between the
distributing corporation and the controlled corporation with
respect to the shareholder. This allocation is made in proportion to
the fair market value of the shareholder's stock of the distributing
corporation and the shareholder's stock of the controlled
corporation, determined immediately after the transaction. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-2(c).
In general, the proposed regulations provide for the reallocation
of items of the corporation among family members under certain
conditions. I.R.C. § 1366(e) requires a determination of whether
an individual family member who renders services for or provides
capital to the S corporation has received reasonable
compensation. The proposed regulations provide that in
determining a reasonable allowance for services rendered for, or
capital furnished to, the S corporation, all the facts and
circumstances are considered, including the amount that
ordinarily would be paid in order to obtain comparable services or
capital from a person who is neither a member of that family nor a
shareholder in the corporation. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-3.
For purposes of I.R.C. § 1366(e), similar rules apply to services
rendered, or capital furnished, to an S corporation by a pass-
through entity in which a member of a shareholder's family holds
an interest. The proposed regulations provide that if the pass-
through entity does not receive reasonable compensation for the
services rendered or capital furnished, the Commissioner may
prescribe adjustments to the pass-through entity and the
corporation as necessary to reflect the value of the services
rendered or capital furnished. I.R.C. § 1366(f) and the proposed
regulations provide special rules limiting the pass through of
certain items of an S corporation to its shareholders. I.R.C. §
1366(f)(1) and the proposed regulations provide that the pass-
through rules under I.R.C. § 1366(a) are inapplicable with respect
to any credit allowable under I.R.C. § 34 (relating to certain uses
of gasoline and special fuels). In addition, I.R.C. § 1366(f)(2) and
(3) and the proposed regulations provide for a reduction in the
pass through of items for tax imposed on an S corporation under
I.R.C. §§ 1374 or 1375. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1366-4.
Section 1309 of TRA 1996 amended I.R.C. § 1368 to require
that in the case of any distribution made during any taxable year,
the adjusted basis of the stock is determined with regard to the
adjustments provided in I.R.C. § 1367(a)(1) for the taxable year.
Thus, the adjustments for distributions made by the S corporation
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during the taxable year are taken into account before applying the
loss limitation for the year.
The proposed regulations provide that for taxable years of the
corporation beginning on or after August 18, 1998, adjustments
to the basis of a share of stock are made in the following order:
(1) increases for income items and the excess of deductions for
depletion over the basis of the property subject to depletion; (2)
decreases for distributions; (3) decreases for noncapital,
nondeductible expenses, and certain oil and gas depletion
deductions; and (4) decreases for items of loss or deduction.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1367-1(e).
Consistent with the proposed amendments to Treas. Reg. §
1.1367-1, the proposed regulations amend Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-2
to provide that for taxable years of the corporation beginning on
or after August 18, 1998, the adjustments to the accumulated
adjustments account (AAA) are made in the same order as the
adjustments to the basis of a share of stock under Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1367-1. For purposes of determining the amount of any
distribution made from the AAA, decreases to the AAA to reflect
distributions are made without taking into account any net
negative adjustments as defined in I.R.C. § 1368(e)(1)(C)(ii).
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-1(e).
Section 1311(a) of TRA 1996 generally eliminated the S
corporation earnings and profits of a corporation accumulated in
those taxable years beginning before January 1, 1983, for which
the corporation was an electing small business corporation under
the provisions of subchapter S of the Code as then in effect, if the
corporation was also an S corporation for its first taxable year
beginning after December 31, 1996. Several provisions of the
existing final regulations under subchapter S, which were
adopted before the 1996 Act amendments, refer separately to S
corporation earnings and profits and C corporation earnings and
profits. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-1(f)(2)(iii). The IRS
requested comments on the extent, if any, to which these
regulations should be amended in view of the general elimination
of S corporation earnings and profits. 63 Fed. Reg. 44181 (Aug.
18, 1998).
TRANSFEREE LIABILITY. The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder of a corporation. The corporation transferred real
property to the shareholder for less than full value, although the
shareholder three years later executed a promissory note for the
unpaid value. The corporation was assessed taxes by the IRS and
the IRS assessed the taxes to the taxpayer when the corporation
failed to pay the taxes. The IRS claimed that the real property
was fraudulently transferred. The taxpayer argued that the IRS
was prevented from assessing the taxpayer because the period for
bringing fraudulent transfer actions under California’s Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act had elapsed. The court held that the IRS
was not bound by the limitation period of the Cal. UFTA. The
court also held that the real property was fraudulently transferred
and that the assessment of transferee liability was timely filed.
Bresson v. Comm’r, 111 T.C. No. 6 (1998).
LABOR
TRANSPORTATION. The plaintiffs were agricultural
workers employed by the defendant. The defendant required the
plaintiffs to meet at specified assembly areas for transport by the
defendant’s vehicles to the daily work site. The plaintiffs were
prohibited from using their own vehicles to get to the work sites.
The plaintiffs sought a ruling that the defendant was required to
compensate the plaintiffs for the time at the assembly point for
waiting for the defendant’s vehicles to pick them up and for the
times spent in transit to the work site and back. Under Industrial
Welfare Commission Wage O..rder No. 14-80, agricultural
employers were required to compensate agricultural workers for
“the time during which an employee is subject to the control of
an employer, and includes all the time the employee is suffered
or permitted to work, whether or not required to do so.” The
plaintiff argued that the wage order included transportation time
where the employee was required to use the employer’s
transportation. The court held that the defendant was not required
to compensate the plaintiffs for the transportation time because
the plaintiffs were not working during the transportation. The
court seems to reason that the second and third phrases of the
quoted portion of the wage order were restricting the broader
words of the first part. Yet the grammatical structure of the
quoted section seems to indicate that compensation is to be paid
for all times an employee is under the control of the employer,
including, but not only, the times when work is done, whether or
not required. The court interpretation makes the first portion
extraneous, violating a doctrine of interpretation that all words
must be given meaning. The case was submitted by Michael
Mauer of Los Angeles. Morillion v. Royal Packing Co., 98
Daily Journal D.A.R. 8891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
